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THE GLOBAL ISSUE OF IMMIGRATION: A FOCUS ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE, REFUGEE IMMIGRANTS FOR GERMANY’S TRADE 




Nowadays, the large scale of migratory movements caused by violence, poverty or 
climate change have made topics related to this worldwide diaspora a vanguard of research 
on international development. For one thing, the so-called “caravan migrants” that traveled 
from Central America in search for a better life in the U.S. have been blocked at the U.S.-
Mexico border while U.S. agricultural sectors that are labor-intensive, such as the sectors 
of fruits and vegetables where most illegal immigrant farmworkers are hired, have been 
suffering from the shortage of farm labors for years. Such a situation calls for a 
development of U.S. immigration laws and policies. On the other hand, years of armed 
conflict in the Middle East and North Africa result in a large number of refugees moving 
to the heart of Europe and directly lead to the European migrant crisis. Whether those 
refuges are good or bad for a host country’s economy is an urgent question that should be 
answered without delay. Lastly, people in least developed countries (LDCs) are forced to 
leave their traditional habitats for improving the quality of life in host countries due to 
climatic factors that jeopardize their existence in their home countries. Those who are 
unable to afford the migration cost are trapped in poverty. How to weaken the “climate-
migration poverty trap” is thus an issue that needs to be addressed as soon as possible. 
This dissertation consists of three essays respectively regarding the three issues 
mentioned above. To begin with, the division of opinions on the U.S. Real ID Act that has 
restricted many illegal immigrants from working allows essay one (Chapter 2) to employ 
a difference-in-differences (DID) method to estimate the impact of the Act implementation 
on U.S. fruit and vegetable sectors that are labor-intensive. A hypothesis is made to pre-
suppose that the impact is negative and then a hypothesis test is conducted for verifying if 
the hypothesis should be rejected or not. Empirical results are in general consistent with 
the hypothesis and suggest a way of legalizing those illegal immigrant farmworkers. 
Essay two (Chapter 3) estimates the relationship between Germany’s refugee stocks 
and its exports to and imports from the home countries where the refugees originate. This 
analysis assumes that Germany’s refugee stocks are positively correlated with its exports 
to and imports from those home countries given lenient immigration policies towards 
refugee immigrants in Germany. It then conducts an estimation to test the hypothesis by 
using a gravity model with a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator. 
Empirical results are not consistent with the hypothesis but suggest that Germany’s refugee 
immigrants may be not yet capable of exerting remarkable pro-trade effects. 
Essay three (Chapter 4) quantifies the impacts of three adaptation means (more 
access to irrigation, less CO2 emission and larger amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)) on the migration rate for 23 LDCs of origin with respect to 129 countries of 
     
 
destination. This analysis assumes that the three adaptation means are effective measures 
for LDCs in response to high temperatures that reduce agricultural yields and that they 
function as promoters that facilitate climate-induced migration. Data used in this essay are 
cross-sectional, so solving the problem of heteroscedasticity and endogeneity by using 
generalized method of moments (GMM) is necessary to ensure that the estimates are not 
biased. Empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis, suggesting that the three 
adaptation means are promising ways of weakening the “climate-migration poverty trap”. 
Overall, the dissertation conducts estimations based on hypothesis tests. It provides 
planners and policy makers with evidence regarding the economic contributions that 
immigrants bring for a host country and sheds light on the measures of dealing with the 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the large scale of migratory movements caused by violence, poverty or 
climate change have made topics related to this worldwide diaspora a vanguard of research 
on international development. For one thing, the so-called “caravan migrants” that traveled 
from Central America in search for a better life in the U.S. have been blocked at the U.S.-
Mexico border while U.S. agricultural sectors that are labor-intensive, such as the sectors 
of fruits and vegetables where most illegal immigrant farmworkers are hired, have been 
suffering from the shortage of farm labors for years. Such a situation calls for a 
development of U.S. immigration laws and policies. On the other hand, years of armed 
conflict in the Middle East and North Africa result in a large number of refugees moving 
to the heart of Europe and directly lead to the European migrant crisis. Whether those 
refuges are good or bad for a host country’s economy is an urgent question that should be 
answered without delay. Lastly, people in least developed countries (LDCs) are forced to 
leave their traditional habitats for improving the quality of life in host countries due to 
climatic factors that jeopardize their existence in their home countries. Those who are 
unable to afford the migration cost are trapped in poverty. How to weaken the “climate-
migration poverty trap” is thus an issue that needs to be addressed as soon as possible. 
1.1 Research Objectives and Dissertation Framework  
This dissertation consists of three essays respectively regarding the three issues 
mentioned above. To begin with, the division of opinions on the U.S. Real ID Act that has 
restricted many illegal immigrants from working allows essay one (Chapter 2) to employ 
a difference-in-differences (DID) method to estimate the impact of the Act implementation 
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on U.S. fruit and vegetable sectors that are labor-intensive. A hypothesis is made to pre-
suppose that the impact is negative and then a hypothesis test is conducted for verifying if 
the hypothesis should be rejected or not.  For the first time, this essay addresses the issue 
of causal effect of those anti-immigration policies on the U.S. economy by using 
econometric methods. 
Essay two (Chapter 3) estimates the relationship between Germany’s refugee stocks 
and its exports to and imports from the home countries where the refugees originate. This 
analysis assumes that Germany’s refugee stocks are positively correlated with its exports 
to and imports from those home countries given lenient immigration policies towards 
refugee immigrants in Germany. It then conducts an estimation to test the hypothesis by 
using a gravity model with a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator. 
This essay is the first to combine the gravity model with PPML estimator to investigate 
the refugee-trade link, providing empirical evidence for further studies. 
Essay three (Chapter 4) quantifies the impacts of three adaptation means (more 
access to irrigation, less CO2 emission and larger amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)) on the migration rate for 23 LDCs of origin with respect to 129 countries of 
destination. This analysis assumes that the three adaptation means are effective measures 
for LDCs in response to high temperatures that reduce agricultural yields and that they 
function as promoters that facilitate climate-induced migration. Data used in this essay are 
cross-sectional, so solving the problem of heteroscedasticity and endogeneity by using 
generalized method of moments (GMM) is necessary to ensure that the estimates are not 
biased.  This essay is the first to quantify the effect of applying multiple adaptation 
strategies on climate-induced migration.  
3 
 
Overall, this dissertation conducts estimations based on hypothesis tests. It provides 
planners and policy makers with evidence regarding the economic contributions that 
immigrants bring for a host country and sheds light on the measures of dealing with the 






















CHAPTER 2.  IMPACTS OF THE REAL ID ACT ON U.S. STATE-LEVEL 
AGRICULTURAL CASH RECEIPTS 
Abstract 
Anti-immigrant provisions of the U.S. Real ID Act have restricted many illegal 
immigrants1 from working and are hypothesized to have negative impacts on labor-
intensive sectors of U.S. agriculture. The division of opinions on the Act participation 
among U.S. states allows the present study to employ a generalized difference-in-
differences (DID) method to estimate impacts of the Act implementation on U.S. state-
level cash receipts for eight categories of agricultural commodities. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, empirical results show that compliance with the Act has negative impacts on 
cash receipts of agricultural commodities produced in labor-intensive sectors, where most 
illegal immigrant farmworkers are hired. While the Act implementation fails to yield a 
significant effect in cash receipts for “Fruits and nuts”, it leads to a decrease in cash 
receipts for “Vegetables and melons” by 17.2%. The weak immigrant-receipt link for 
“Fruits and nuts” suggests that growers’ vulnerability to changes in immigration policies 
varies by commodities, and the strong immigrant-receipt link for “Vegetables and melons” 
calls on the need for a deceleration of current immigration law enforcement and a tacit 
tolerance of unauthorized employment. 
KEYWORDS: Real ID Act, Agricultural Cash Receipts, Difference-in-differences, Illegal 







The Real ID Act, enacted on May 11th, 2005, is an Act of Congress that modifies 
U.S. federal law pertaining to new authentication standards for state-issued driver’s 
licenses and non-driver identification cards, as well as various immigration policies 
pertaining to terrorism (Wikipedia, 2020). While the passage of the Real ID Act is aimed 
to strengthen U.S. national security, several portions of the Act have imposed stricter 
standards of proof for individuals applying for the Real ID credentials – thereby restricting 
illegal immigrants, who are unable to prove their legal status or who lack social security 
numbers, from working, causing many immigrants and foreign nationals to lose their jobs 
(Wikipedia, 2020). Figure 2.1 provides unauthorized immigrant population trends for top 
U.S. states. As Figure 2.1 shows, the number of unauthorized immigrants, for most states, 
rose sharply in the 1990s and reached their peaks in 2007 when the recession began. They 
declined through the end of the recession in 2009 and then stabilized with a slightly further 
decline until ticking down in 2017. Given the large number of unauthorized immigrants in 
the U.S., the impact caused by the Real ID Act is expected to be huge. 
The website of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) presents a 
timeline for the history behind the Real ID Act: it starts with the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, after which the whole nation was shocked by the sheer horror. U.S. 
states then accelerated their efforts to counter issues with counterfeit driver’s licenses and 
identification cards in order to prevent terrorists from gaining immigration status in the 
U.S. In July 2002, the first “National Strategy for Homeland Security” produced by the 
Office of Homeland Security was released. It outlined major state initiatives, including 
driver’s licenses: states with assistance from the federal government should craft solutions 
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to curtail the future abuse of driver’s licenses by terrorist organizations. In July 2004, the 
9/11 Commission issued a 585-page report on how to reform the U.S. Intelligence 
community and to implement other security measures to prevent future terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. On page 390, under the heading Immigration Law and Enforcement, 
minimum standards for identification documents were developed. In December 2004, 
President Bush signed into law the “National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004”. The law 
required the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to establish a negotiated rule making process 
to establish minimum standards for state-issued driver's licenses and identification cards. 
On May 11, 2005, President Bush signed into law the “Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriation for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005”, which 
included the “Real ID Act of 2005”.  
Although people whose ID cards do not meet the new federal standards are not 
allowed to fly on a domestic commercial flight or enter a federal building after October 1, 
2020, the Act participation by states is voluntary. Some states have adopted the Act, while 
some others refused to implement it. As of October 2018, 37 states and territories have 
been certified as compliant, and 19, that provide adequate justification for noncompliance, 
have granted extensions of time to meet the Real ID requirements. It was expected that all 
but four of the 56 U.S. states/territories would be issuing Real ID compliant licenses/IDs 
by early 2019 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)). Regan and Deering (2009) 
find that relatively less populous, less wealthy, and more conservative states were more 
likely to oppose the Real ID Act. To get more insight into the geographic differences, 
Figure 2.2 shows the status of states regarding the Real ID Act by the end of 2017. In 
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Figure 2.2, the 27 states in green are considered in the “compliant group” and the 23 states 
in yellow are considered in the “non-compliant group”.  
In addition, there is a tremendous variation in the timing of the Act implementation 
across U.S. states.  As Table 2.1 shows, the Act implementation had been implemented in 
13 states as early as 2012, whereas the two states – Oklahoma and Oregon are still being 
granted extension up to now. Therefore, the Real ID Act was not mandatorily imposed at 
the national level and not all states treated it identically. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009), 
in their study of food stamp program, emphasize the shortcomings of the absence of such 
a variation in the timing for a research design. The variation of the Real ID Act starting 
date precludes boiling down the present study to a simple before-after analysis for causal 
effects.  
When it comes to the agricultural sector, Passel and Cohn (2018) estimate that 
325,000 unauthorized immigrants worked in the U.S. agricultural sector in 2016. Passel 
and Cohn (2015) report that it is farming in which unauthorized immigrant employees are 
the highest share of the workforce in most states. The farming sector has grown 
increasingly dependent on a steady supply of workers who have entered the U.S. illegally 
and this has created a situation where presently half of all crop farmworkers are 
unauthorized (Ruark and Moinuddin 2011).  
Table 2.2 presents 2014 estimated unauthorized immigrant population by state. 
These tabulations show that the numbers of both unauthorized immigrants and 
unauthorized immigrant farmworkers differ significantly among states. For the number of 
unauthorized immigrants, California, Texas, Florida and New York are the top 4. These 
four states plus New Jersey and Illinois account for 59% of unauthorized immigrants in 
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the U.S. (Passel, Cohn, and Pew Research Center 2016). California and New York have 
more job opportunities and friendlier immigration policies than other states. California 
even made history by officially becoming the first sanctuary state in 2018. Bohn, Lofstrom, 
and Raphael (2014) summarize that the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), a 
restrictive state law concerning unauthorized immigrants, may cause those planning to 
migrate illegally to Arizona to migrate elsewhere, because LAWA has made it more 
difficult for them to find work there. They also document a notable and statistically 
significant reduction in the proportion of the Hispanic noncitizen population in Arizona 
that matches the timing of LAWA’s implementation. Watson (2013) finds that one type of 
287(g) agreement3 nearly doubles the propensity for the foreign-born to relocate within 
the United States. So more lenient immigration policies may partially explain the large 
number of unauthorized immigrants in California and New York.  
Only 4% of unauthorized immigrant workers held farming jobs, and 48% are 
employed in service and construction occupations (Passel and Cohn 2016). California and 
Texas lead the nation in the number of unauthorized farmworkers. In 2014, the shares of 
farming’s civilian workforce in the two states that consists of unauthorized immigrants are 
35% and 26%, respectively (Passel and Cohn 2016). Unauthorized immigrant farmworkers 
account for a small percentage of the farm labor force for New York and Illinois 
(percentages less than that in the occupations of construction, service, and production) and 
are not reported. Generally, unauthorized immigrant farmworkers are widely distributed 
in both “compliant” and “non-compliant” states, which is valid for data analysis. 
The Real ID Act affects those immigrant farmworkers in two ways. First, the Act 
causes decreased employment among illegal immigrant farmworkers. Under the increased 
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authentication standards, their driver’s licenses or non-driver identification cards may not 
be renewed or may be retroactively canceled. Without driver’s licenses or non-driver 
identification cards, they are unable to complete documents (e.g., form I-94) proving work 
authorization in the U.S. Employers in the agricultural sector are required to verify that 
everybody working for them is authorized to work in the U.S. on pain of severe penalties 
and even criminal prosecution for hiring workers who do not present appropriate 
documents (Wroblewski 2019). Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) find strong evidence of a 
decline in employment among male Latin American immigrants under the stricter 
immigration-related law enforcement including the implementation of the Real ID Act in 
the post-9/11 period.  
Second, weaker workforce participation may take place. Studies show that 
individuals who lack the ability to obtain a driver’s license have more difficulties in 
maintaining steady employment (Pawasarat and Stetzer 1998; Sandradanziger, Danziger, 
and Heflin 2000). Since lack of public transportation is especially prominent in rural areas 
where many immigrants settle, driving in these regions is not a privilege, but rather, a 
necessity to perform daily activities associated with living such as working or conducting 
regular business transactions (García 2006). Those illegal immigrant farmworkers do not 
always have access to public transportation or other transit opportunities, and they thus 
may become less flexible in response to advanced planning for work shifts and overall 
have weaker ability to work more frequently. Farm employers may find it less attractive 
to hire individuals, who often show up late or miss work shifts.  
Which sectors in the field of U.S. agriculture does the Real ID Act affect the most? 
Johnson (2014) reports that farm labor accounts for 42% of the variable production 
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expenses for U.S. fruit and vegetable farms and that increased enforcement of immigration 
laws is resulting in labor shortages, especially for harvesting tree fruits and specialty row 
crops. Labor-intensive fruit and vegetable farming attracts a relatively large illegal 
workforce. Carroll, Georges, and Saltz (2011) document the findings of the National 
Agricultural Workers Survey (1989 – 2009) that most of the 54,000 farmworkers 
interviewed work in the sectors of “Fruits and Nuts” and “Vegetables”. Martin and Calvin 
(2010) report that farms producing fruits and nuts, vegetables and melons, and horticultural 
specialties, such as greenhouse and nursery crops, accounted for $ 13.6 billion, or over 
half of the $26.4 billion in U.S. farm labor expenditures in 2007. On the other hand, prior 
studies present that farm work does not appeal to U.S. citizens due to relatively low wages, 
hard physical labor, and seasonal work (Martin and Calvin 2010; Ruark and Moinuddin 
2011), so an orchardist, nursery operator, packer, or processor, who hires seasonal 
farmworkers, may have no alternatives but to employ illegal immigrants. By contrast, 
land-intensive crops (e.g., wheat, corn, cotton, soybean, and sorghum) are largely 
automated and do not depend heavily on illegal immigrant workers. Hence, the Real ID 
Act is expected to have a significant impact on the labor-intensive sectors, such as the 
sectors of fruit and vegetable. 
The Real ID Act implementation may result in two economic effects towards labor-
intensive agricultural sectors. First, it may put upward pressure on farm wages. Agriculture 
industry groups in many states have consistently complained of a shortage of agricultural 
workers, yet tighter immigration policies tend to reduce the supply of agricultural workers 
even further (Blanco 2016; Michigan Law Revision Commission 47th annual report 2015-
2016; Richards 2018). Ali and Lucier (2011) from the USDA report that chronic farm 
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labor shortages are one of the challenges that U.S. vegetable and melon production 
industry faces. Holding the labor demand curve unchanged, the reduced labor availability 
may cause a substantial leftward shift of the agricultural labor supply curve – thereby 
increasing farm wages and, in turn, raising the cost of farm labor for employers in the 
“compliant” states. Richards (2018) conducts counter-factual policy simulations and finds 
that removing 50% all undocumented farmworkers from California would lead to an 
increase in wages of over 22%. Employers in the “noncompliant” states, on the other hand, 
can gain from lower labor costs and the ability to use their land, capital, and technology 
more productively.  
Second, the Act implementation may disrupt the flow of “pickers”. Fruits and 
vegetables become ripe at a fixed time and must be picked quickly before they rot. If 
farmers cannot find workers when they need them, their crops may be ruined (Fan, Pena, 
and Perloff’s 2016). During harvest seasons, both migrant and seasonal farmworkers5 may 
move from farm to farm to remain employed. Following the growing season, those illegal 
immigrant farmworkers often travel a set route (e.g., Florida and its way north) (Fitz 2012), 
so disrupting this flow may have a negative impact on the fruit and vegetable sectors. 
Given the two economic effects, those non-compliant states may gain a comparative 
advantage in producing labor-intensive agricultural products. On the other hand, fruit and 
vegetable growers in the compliant states, in response to rising wages and worsening labor 
availability, may use less labor by stop planting or harvesting a field, switch to crops whose 
harvesting and processing systems can easily be mechanized, or simply sell their farmland. 
Therefore, states with such a comparative disadvantage are expected to face reduced yields 
and, in turn, reduced cash receipts of labor-intensive agricultural products. 
12 
 
As discussed above, the following hypothesis is made: 
H. The implementation of the U.S. Real ID Act has had a statistically negative 
impact on cash receipts for the labor-intensive agricultural sectors of fruit and vegetable 
in states compliant with the Act. The non-labor-intensive sectors have been influenced as 
well, but in a statistically insignificant way. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The reliance of labor-intensive sectors on unauthorized immigrants has made the 
question, “How to address their unauthorized status?”, one of the most challenging policy 
issues these days. Much has been written about the connection between immigration 
policies and their economic impacts. Previous studies in this field of interest tend to point 
out the pernicious effects of accelerated immigration enforcement in developed countries 
on their economies and suggest a tacit tolerance of unauthorized employment: Zahniser et 
al. (2012) evaluate two hypothetical scenarios by using a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model and conclude that a 40 percent reduction in the number of unauthorized 
workers throughout the U.S. economy had a marked, long run impact on U.S. agriculture, 
causing a 2- to 5-percent relative decline in agricultural output; a 2- to 9-percent relative 
decline in farm exports, and a 3- to 7-percent relative increase in the wage rate for U.S.-
born and foreign-born, permanent resident farmworkers; Zahniser et al. (2011) conduct an 
immigration policy simulation and find that for the most labor-intensive agricultural 
sectors, the policy expansion scenario (looser application of immigration controls) results 
in a long-run 1-2% increase in output and 0.2-3.2% increase in exports, while the policy 
enforcement scenario (tighter application of immigration controls) results in a 2-4% 
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decrease in output and 0.8-6.3% decrease in exports; Genc et al. (2012) perform a meta-
analysis and find that an increase in the number of immigrants by 10 percent may be 
expected to increase the volume of trade on average by about 1.5 percent; Faustino and 
Leitão (2008) use a static and dynamic panel data analysis and find that the stock of 
immigrants has a positive effect on Portuguese exports, imports and bilateral intra-industry 
trade.  
Michigan’s Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers Workgroup (MSFW) (2013) issues 
a report that recommended improving the system in which migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers go about applying for licenses and that made it clear that access to a driver’s 
license is extremely important for regular seasonal and migrant farmworkers’ ability to 
participate in the workforce. Fitz (2012) reports that the Georgia Agribusiness Council 
estimated that the state could lose up to $1 billion in produce from a lack of immigrant 
labor after the passage of Georgia’s anti-immigrant law, H.B.87 and that a survey of 
farmers conducted by the Georgia Department of Agriculture found 56 percent of those 
surveyed were having trouble finding workers. 
When it comes to impacts of the Real ID Act, most existing literature focused on 
examining the case law upon which some of the provisions are based and offering 
interpretations for unclear provisions. Cianciarulo (2006) argues that several portions of 
the Act may result in the denial of bona fide asylum applications and provides concrete 
guidance for policymakers to protect victims of persecution. Fletcher (2006) predicts that 
the Real ID Act may perpetuate gender bias and widen the gap between access to 
protection of asylum seekers in general and that of asylum seekers escaping gender-related 
persecution. The paper also discusses legal strategies for minimizing the negative 
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consequences of the Act through both strategic representation of asylum seekers and 
broader advocacy efforts. García (2006) concludes that 1) under the anti-immigrant 
provisions of the Real ID Act, it will be more difficult for immigrants to obtain asylum in 
the U.S.; 2) immigrants, legal and illegal, will have difficulty obtaining an acceptable 
driver’s license and an identification card which are necessary to live and conduct 
everyday transactions in the U.S.; 3) immigrant lives will be put at risk with the 
construction of physical barriers along the U.S. borders.  
So far, no study has addressed the issue of causal effect of those anti-immigration 
policies on the U.S. economy, not to mention on agricultural cash receipts, by using 
econometric methods (e.g., difference-in-differences, regression discontinuity, propensity 
score and synthetic control). The present article contributes to the literature by applying a 
generalized difference-in-differences (DID) method to quantifying the expected negative 
impact and provides empirical evidence for further studies. 
2.3 Econometric Model 
Following the methodology from Hoynes and Schanzenbach’s (2009) study of the 
food stamp program, a generalized DID model is employed, with controls for state and 
year fixed effects. We do not add state-specific linear time trends for assuming yearly 
values of agricultural cash receipts to be stationary. In particular, the following model is 
estimated: 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡    (2.1) 
where ln𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is log of cash receipt for commodity i produced in state s in year t. 𝑌 includes 
cash receipts for fruits and nuts, vegetables and melons, cattle and calves, hogs, poultry 
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and eggs, wheat, corn, and oil crops. 𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if state s 
in year t is certified by DHS as Real ID compliant. 𝐹𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑠𝑡 is the number of hired 
laborers engaged in the direct production of agricultural commodities for state s in year t. 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡  is a vector that contains expenses for inputs used as control variables for 
producing commodity i (i.e., expenses on feed, livestock and poultry, seed, pesticide 
purchases, fertilizer, lime, and soil conditioner, petroleum fuel and oil, electricity, contract 
labor and hired labor, non-cash employee compensation, and other expenses)  for state s 
in year t. 𝜂𝑠 are state fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 are the error terms. 
Standard errors are clustered on state. All estimates are weighted by each year’s state-level 
farms GDP correspondingly. 
The DID approach depends heavily on the counterfactual assumption that the 
treatment and control groups experience a common trend, also known as a parallel trend, 
in the absence of a policy change, with the treatment and control groups tending to have 
different trajectories after the policy change. To show the parallel trend, Figure 2.3 plots 
cash receipt trends of vegetables and melons for ten U.S. states that adopted the Real ID 
Act in the earliest year 2012 and that for eighteen states that were in the non-compliant 
group by the end of the year 2017. As Figure 2.3 shows, before 2012 the trend lines for 
the compliant group and the non-compliant group are nearly, although not perfectly, 
paralleled, but after 2012 the former group tends to have a downward trend and the latter 
group tends to have an upward trend. This implies a success of the research design in the 
sense of a parallel trend in counterfactual outcomes for commodities produced in labor-




The website of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic 
Research Service provides state-level cash receipts in real 2019 dollars by agricultural 
commodity, 1998 – 2017. Data about the status of states regarding the Real ID Act (i.e., 
DHS certification as the Act compliant by year) are obtained from Wikipedia. The website 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides 1998 – 2017 state GDP in chained 
2012 dollars for the industry of “Farms” that includes both crop and animal production 
and provides data on “Farm wage and salary employment” that is the number of hired 
laborers engaged in the direct production of agricultural commodities, either livestock or 
crops. Data on agricultural input expenses in real 2019 dollars come from USDA U.S. and 
State-Level Farm Income and Wealth Statistics. For each of the agricultural commodities, 
we exclude states that have missing value(s) of cash receipt in any of the 20 years. The 
total values of cash receipt for states with the missing value(s) are all very small – thereby 
making themselves inconsequential for the analysis. The final data set contains cash 
receipts for eight categories of commodities, the dummy for state status, the farms GDP, 
the farm employment estimates, and eleven categories of agricultural input expenses. 
There are separate regressions for each of the commodities on the 20-year panel data. Table 
2.3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study.  
2.5 Empirical Results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 2.4. Overall, the values of R2 are all above 
90%, indicating a good fit. As row 1 of Table 2.4 shows, the coefficient on the state-status 
dummy variable has the expected negative sign for “fruits and nuts”, but it surprisingly is 
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not strong enough to yield significant effects. This unexpected result may be due to 
“growers’ vulnerability to changes in labor costs varies by commodities” (Calvin and 
Martin 2010; Calvin and Martin 2012). In other words, the picking or processing may or 
may not be mechanized depending on the characteristics of the commodity being 
produced. It is likely that fruit growers have adopted mechanized harvesters or other labor-
saving technologies more easily due to certain fruits’ unique characteristics. For example, 
harvesting for Florida’s processing oranges and California’s fresh-market oranges are 
partially mechanized. Given fruit growers’ mechanized strategies to adapt to the rising 
wages caused by reduced farm labors, U.S. fruit industry may not have been significantly 
affected by the Real ID Act implementation. The coefficients on contract labor and that on 
hired labor for “fruits and nuts” are positive and statistically significant both at the 1% 
significance level. Holding other factors constant, a one-billion increase in contract labor 
expenses and that in hired labor expenses lead to an increase in cash receipts for “fruits 
and nuts” by 27.5% and 17.6%, respectively – a remarkable sign that fruits and nuts are 
produced in a labor-intensive sector. 
Unlike the coefficient on the state-status dummy variable for “fruits and nuts”, that 
for “vegetables and melons” is negative and statistically significant at the 10% significance 
level. Holding other factors constant, the Real ID Act implementation leads to a decrease 
in cash receipts for “vegetables and melons” by 17.2%, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that we make. The coefficients on contract labor and that on hired labor for 
“vegetables and melons” are not statistically significant. This empirical result seems 
surprising at the first glance for more labor costs should be correlated with more outcome 
for labor-intensive agricultural sectors. However, it makes sense if we know that illegal 
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immigrant workers have annual incomes that are $5600 less than that of authorized 
workers working in the same farming sector (Ruark and Moinuddin 2011) – they are 
underpaid compared to their legal counterparts. In this case, vegetable growers may prefer 
spending on illegal workers to spending on legal ones. If U.S. vegetable sector has a 
significant part, where illegal employment takes place, legal labor costs (e.g., contract 
labor expenses and hired labor expenses) could become a less important factor that 
contributes to the increase in agricultural output in this sector. The coefficients in row 1 
for other agricultural products are all statistically insignificant, which is in accord with the 
hypothesis that there is not a statistically significant relationship between the Act 
implementation and non-labor-intensive agricultural sectors that do not depend heavily on 
illegal immigrant workers.  
2.6 Conclusions and Discussions 
The basic purpose of this study is to quantify the economic impact of the 
implementation of the Real ID Act on U.S. agricultural cash receipts. We assume that 
compliance with the Act affects significantly and negatively on cash receipts of 
agricultural commodities produced in the labor-intensive sectors of fruit and vegetable, 
where most illegal immigrant farmworkers are hired, and that it does not have a statistically 
significant impact on agricultural cash receipts for non-labor-intensive sectors. The results 
are generally consistent with the hypothesis. The vegetable sector, as expected, is found to 
experience a decrease in its cash receipt by 17.2%, and cash receipts for the non-labor-
intensive crops are not statistically impacted.  
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The fruit sector is an exception. Changes in cash receipt in this sector are neutral to 
the Act implementation, indicating that farmers have strategies to alleviate the impact 
caused by reduced labor supply. Mechanization is one of the ways through which they can 
overcome this reduced supply. But the same strategy may not be used in the vegetable 
sector, because it is more difficult for the vegetable sector to be mechanized – automated 
picking and harvesting are more widely used in the fruit sector than in the vegetable sector. 
This keeps the fruit sector less reliant on illegal immigrant farmworkers – thereby making 
this sector less sensitive to the Act implementation. 
The shortage of labor force in agriculture has been a critical problem that haunts 
certain sectors of U.S. agriculture for decades. Unsteady federal immigration policy and 
enforcement put U.S. farmers in a dilemma – whether to hire an immigrant worker when 
realizing that his or her documentation may not be valid. Even if illegal employment takes 
place, without working authorization, those immigrant workers’ human rights cannot be 
fully protected, and their working conditions cannot be properly improved. The saving 
grace for U.S. agriculture has been the H-2A guest worker program. It provides a 
temporary visa to foreign workers. They return home when their job is over. However, this 
program is limited to temporary workers, and it is too costly for some U.S. farmers. Given 
the strong connection between farm labor supply and the agricultural economy, creating a 
process through which those unauthorized immigrants can work legally, at least giving 
them basic rights for living, such as issuing a driver’s license or an identification card, 
would stabilize the agricultural labor market and enhance U.S. food security. 
The present study has its own limitation. The analysis is limited only to the 
agricultural sector. However, most illegal immigrant workers are hired in the industries of 
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construction and service. If further studies could compare results to that in the sectors of 
construction, hotels, and restaurants, like Fan, Pena, and Perloff’s (2016) recession-
farmworker study, we would gain a better and more comprehensive understanding of the 
consequences caused by the implementation of the Real ID Act and the conclusions drawn 




















2.7 Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 States by year of DHS certification as Real ID compliant 
2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Granted extension 
Colorado Alabama Nevada Arizona North Carolina Idaho Alaska New Jersey Oklahoma 
Connecticut Florida  Arkansas Texas Louisiana California  Oregon 
Delaware Hawaii  New Mexico  Massachusetts Illinois   
Georgia Kansas    Michigan Kentucky   
Indiana Mississippi    Minnesota Maine   
Iowa Nebraska    New Hampshire Missouri   
Maryland Utah    New York Montana   
Ohio Vermont    North Dakota Pennsylvania   
South Dakota     South Carolina Rhode Island   
Tennessee     Virginia    
West Virginia     Washington    
Wisconsin         
Wyoming         










Table 2.2 Estimated unauthorized immigrant population, by state, 2014 
State 
Unauthorized immigrant population Population of unauthorized immigrant 
farmworkers2 
Population Rank Population Rank 
Alabama 65,000 32 4765 30 
Alaska 10,000 42 25 39 
Arizona 325,000 9 20618 10 
Arkansas 70,000 30 9093 23 
California 2,350,000 1 130347 1 
Colorado 200,000 15 13534 16 
Connecticut 120,000 19 1585 35 
Delaware 25,000 40 606 37 
Florida 850,000 3 43130 4 
Georgia 375,000 7 19034 11 
Hawaii 45,000 35 3496 33 
Idaho 45,000 35 30243 8 
Illinois 450,000 6 * * 
Indiana 110,000 21 6200 27 
Iowa 40,000 38 4571 31 
Kansas 75,000 29 12249 18 
Kentucky 50,000 34 34263 7 
Louisiana 70,000 30 8922 25 
Maine < 5,000 45 * * 
Maryland 250,000 11 6070 28 
Massachusetts 210,000 13 * * 
Michigan 130,000 17 22487 9 
Minnesota 100,000 22 11532 19 
Mississippi 25,000 40 1355 36 
Missouri 55,000 33 5057 29 
Montana < 5,000 45 * * 
Nebraska 45,000 35 2806 34 
Nevada 210,000 13 4182 32 
New Hampshire 10,000 42 * * 
New Jersey 500,000 5 6937 26 
New Mexico 85,000 26 16648 14 
New York 775,000 4 * * 
North Carolina 350,000 8 42027 5 
North Dakota < 5,000 45 * * 
Ohio 95,000 24 10119 20 
Oklahoma 95,000 24 17028 13 
Oregon 130,000 17 37131 6 
Pennsylvania 180,000 16 17156 12 
Rhode Island 30,000 39 506 38 
South Carolina 85,000 26 10096 21 
South Dakota 5,000 44 * * 
Tennessee 120,000 19 9073 24 
Texas 1,650,000 2 95702 2 
Utah 100,000 22 9262 22 
Vermont < 5,000 45 * * 
Virginia 300,000 10 13632 15 
Washington 250,000 11 70144 3 
West Virginia < 5,000 45 * * 
Wisconsin 80,000 28 12912 17 
Wyoming 5,000 44 * * 
Note: The numbers have been rounded up to the nearest digits. “*” indicates either “data unavailable” or “data 
unreported due to less than 5,000 unauthorized immigrants in the civilian labor force in 2014”.  
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 2014 based on augmented American Community Survey. 2014 Farm 
employment, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
 




Table 2.3 Variables and summary statistics 
 Units N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable       
Fruits and nuts  Billions of 2019$ 680 0.71 2.79 0.01 24.97 
Vegetables and melons  Billions of 2019$ 820 0.52 1.35 0.0007 9.78 
Cattle and calves Billions of 2019$ 1000 1.28 2.18 0.0006 13.82 
Hogs Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.39 0.98 0.0002 9.93 
Poultry and eggs Billions of 2019$ 960 0.82 1.16 0.000002 5.95 
Wheat Billions of 2019$ 840 0.27 0.43 0.0009 2.88 
Corn Billions of 2019$ 820 1.04 2.01 0.004 15.00 
Oil crops Billions of 2019$ 760 0.88 1.28 0.0001 7.14 
Independent Variable       
CState 1 = Compliant 1000 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Farm employment  Ten thousand jobs 1000 1.62 2.79 0.02 27.24 
Feed purchases  Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.99 1.14 0.002 6.87 
Livestock and poultry purchases Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.49 0.88 0.000007 5.77 
Seed purchases  Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.34 0.43 0.003 2.45 
Pesticide purchases Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.27 0.32 0.0003 2.26 
Expenses on fertilizer, lime, and soil conditioner Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.43 0.51 0.002 2.94 
Expenses on petroleum fuel and oil Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.28 0.28 0.002 1.66 
Expenses on electricity Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.11 0.15 0.0006 1.29 
Contract labor expenses Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.10 0.36 0.0004 3.88 
Hired labor expenses Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.55 0.96 0.01 8.74 
Non-cash employee compensation Billions of 2019$ 1000 0.01 0.02 0.0001 0.14 
Other expenses Billions of 2019$ 1000 2.93 2.98 0.02 18.58 
Weight       
Farms GDP  Billions of 2012$ 1000 3.17 4.33 0.02 40.25 














Table 2.4 Estimation results 
 Fruits and nuts Vegetables and melons Cattle and calves Hogs Poultry and eggs Wheat Corn Oil crops 
































































































































































































































Number of observations 680 820 1000 1000 960 840 820 760 
R2 0.991 0.976 0.992 0.988 0.977 0.976 0.989 0.986 
States excluded AK, AR, DE, 
IN, IA, KS, 
KY, MT, NE, 
NV, NH, ND, 
RI, SD, TN, 
WY 
CT, IA, KY, MA, NH, 
OK, RI, VT, WV 












CT, HI, ME, 
MA, NV, 
NH, RI, VT, 
WV, WY 
Note: Each estimate is from a separate regression of the outcome variable with state fixed effects and year fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered on state. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. All estimates are weighted by each year’s state-level farms GDP correspondingly. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1 Unauthorized immigrant population trends for top U.S. states, 1990-2017 
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Figure 2.2 The status of states regarding the Real ID Act by the end of 2017 
Source: Authors’ tabulation of data from Wikipedia (Table 2.1). 
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Figure 2.3 Parallel trends: 2012 Compliant Group versus Non-compliant Group 
Note: The figure plots cash receipt trends of vegetables and melons for ten U.S. states that adopted the Real ID Act in 
the earliest year 2012 and that for eighteen states that were in the non-compliant group by the end of the year 2017. The 
values of the cash receipts for the two groups are averages weighted by each year’s state-level farms GDP 
correspondingly. The 2012 Compliant Group includes Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming. The Non-compliant Group includes Alaska, California, Idaho, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington. The values for the 2012 Compliant Group have been multiplied 
by 10 for comparison. Connecticut, Iowa, West Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Rhode Island, 
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CHAPTER 3.  IMPACTS OF REFUGEE IMMIGRANTS ON GERMANY’S 
TRADE 
Abstract 
Germany’s pro-immigration policies towards refugees are hypothesized to enhance the 
connection between Germany’s refugee immigrants and the countries where they originate, 
thereby enabling those refugee immigrants to facilitate Germany’s exports to and imports 
from those home countries. Employing data on Germany’s refugee stocks and trade flows 
with 71 home countries, we quantify impacts of Germany’s refugee immigrants on its 
bilateral trade. The refugee-trade link is estimated by using a gravity model. A Poisson 
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is used to deal with the zero-trade-value 
problem. Empirical results show that Germany’s refugee stocks do not have a positive and 
significant impact on its exports to and imports from those home countries. The 
surprisingly weak refugee-trade link for Germany suggests that refugee immigrants there 
are not capable of exerting pro-trade effects, despite Germany’s friendly immigration 
policies. 











   
3.1 Introduction 
Known as a major immigrant destination as well as a target country for flows of 
asylum seekers looking for sanctuary, Germany had 1.1 million refugees in its territory by 
the end of 2018 and is the only western industrialized nation among the top ten refugee 
host countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Global Trends 
2018). Since the European migrant crisis, the large number of refugees arriving in 
Germany have drawn significant attention worldwide and have aroused intense political, 
social, and academic debates. Quantifying the effect of receiving refugee immigrants can 
help answer whether refugees are good or bad for a host country’s economy. 
While few existing studies have analyzed impacts of refugee immigrants on a host 
country’s trade, much has been written about how immigrants without entry classifications 
(e.g., non-refugees, refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and stateless 
persons) affect a host country’s exports to and imports from the countries that immigrants 
originate. The key paper on the refugee-trade link is White (2007), who proposes the 
“transplanted home bias” channel – immigrants with preferences for goods that are 
unavailable in a host country potentially increase that host country’s imports from the 
home country.  
On the other hand, immigrants may have knowledge of home country markets that, 
if exploited, could increase trade flows (White and Tadesse 2010). Researchers refer to 
this channel as “information bridge hypothesis” (Dunlevy 2006). Greenaway, Mahabir, 
and Milner (2007) further expound this channel as involving a “cultural bridge” and an 
“enforcement bridge”. The former bridge is presented as helping lower communication 
barriers by immigrants understanding both home and host countries’ languages, and 
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business culture and regulations, hence increasing trade flows between home and host 
countries. The latter bridge means that sanctions for violations of contracts in international 
trade can be enforced through co-ethnic networks, which promote trade flows. In general, 
existing literature reaches a consensus that immigration exerts a positive effect on a host 
country’s exports and imports (White 2007; Tung, Chung, and Enderwick 2011; Girma 
and Yu 2002; White 2008; Genc et al. 2012). 
When it comes to immigration policies towards refugees in Germany, especially 
after the European migrant crisis, Germany government has been known to fulfill its 
humanitarian obligations well. Germany opened its border to hundreds of thousands of 
refugees, provided refugees with good, basic living conditions, offered them language and 
vocational trainings, and has won world-wide reputation (Ostrand 2015; Gurer 2019; 
Anderson 2016). Such efforts to integrate those refugee immigrants suggest that refugees 
in Germany live in good institutional and economic status, and that they can well 
participate in social activities – thereby imposing enhanced influence on the trade flows 
between Germany and their home countries. From this perspective, the following 
hypothesis is made: 
H. Given lenient immigration policies towards refugee immigrants in Germany, 
Germany’s refugee stocks are positively correlated with its exports to and imports from 
those home countries. 
3.2 Literature review 
Voluminous studies have investigated the immigrant-trade link by using different 
models. The commonly used ones are gravity models (Piperakis, Milner, and Wright 2003; 
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Faustino and Leitão 2008; Parsons 2005; Genc et al. 2012; White and Tadesse 2010; White 
2007; Girma and Yu 2002), which form a log-linear relationship among trade flows, traits 
of home and host countries, and immigrant stocks. Literature with other models that relates 
to the immigrant-trade link involves Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002), who develop an 
alternative functional form with a constant-elasticity specification and a decreasing 
marginal effect specification to capture the immigration-trade link in their study on 
Canadian Provinces’ immigration and trade; Bowen and Wu (2013), who apply a unique 
derivation to an economy that they model and find that immigration and trade are 
complements; Kohn (2001), who uses a Heckscher – Ohlin –Samuelson Model to examine 
the relationship between immigration and trading partners’ capital transfers. 
When it comes to the refugee-trade link, we only find two papers related to this 
topic. One is Ghosh and Enami (2015), who examine the impact of refugees from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan on the bilateral trade between the two countries by using a Vector 
Error Correctio model and Granger causality tests and find that changes in Afghani 
refugees do not granger cause movements in the bilateral trade. The other is White and 
Tadesse (2010), who compare how refugee and non-refugee immigrants affect U.S. trade 
with their home countries by using a gravity model and find that the influence of refugee 
immigrants is much smaller than that of their non-refugee counterpart. This paper, 
however, fails to consider the zero-trade-value problem. 
The presence of zero trade flows is a common feature of trade data both at the 
aggregate and disaggregate levels. Simply excluding zero-trade-value or using traditional 
estimators (e.g., standard threshold-Tobit estimators) when zero trade flows are involved 
may yield severely biased estimates, and researchers find that Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
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Likelihood (PPML) estimator is a preferred estimator for solving this problem (Martin and 
Pham 2020; Burger, Van Oort, and Linders 2009; Hurd 1979). To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to combine the gravity model with the PPML estimator 
to investigate the refugee-trade link, providing empirical evidence for further studies. 
3.3 Model and data 
We follow White and Tadesse’s (2010) study on U.S. refugee-trade link by using a 
gravity model with 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝜙
, a vector that contains trade-facilitating/inhibiting factors that are 
often discussed in the literature (e.g., population, exchange rate, contiguity, common 
language, colonial ties, and membership in the same regional trade agreement (RTA)). In 
particular, the gravity equation can be written as: 








𝑖𝑗𝑡   (3.1) 
where each of the three types of trade flows (i.e., trade in aggregate, manufacturing and 
agricultural goods) between two countries i and j during year t (𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡) is an increasing 
function of the trading partners’ combined economic scale measured in the product of host 
country GDP (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝛽1) and home country GDP (𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝛽2) and is a decreasing function of the two 
countries’ geodesic distance (𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛾1). 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. Allowing 𝛼 to be a constant, we 




   
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙1𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜙2𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙3𝐿𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙4𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜙5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙8𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡    (3.2) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is Germany’s refugee stock from home country j in year t. 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 
are population of Germany in year t and population of home country j in year t, 
respectively. 𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡 is exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and local currency of 
home country j in year t. 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡 is exchange rate between Euro and local currency 
of home country j in year t. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 are three dummies. They 
are equal to one if Germany and home country j have a common border, common official 
language(s), and colonial ties, respectively. 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 is another dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 if Germany belongs to the same RTA with home country j in year t. 
To deal with zero-trade observations, we then use a PPML estimator in Sun and 
Reed’s (2010) free trade agreement study. We specify the model as: 
𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = exp{𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙1𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜙2𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙3𝐿𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙4𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜙5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝜙8𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑗𝑡}   (3.3) 
Standard errors are clustered on country to control unobservable characteristics that lead 
to similar effects in different years for the trading partners.  
White (2007) states, “assuming that high-income nations have developed markets 
and contracting procedures and that low-income nations have less complete markets and 
weaker contracting and enforcement mechanisms, it is likely that immigrants from lower-
income nations present opportunities for increased trade.” He then stratifies the home 
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countries by income class and finds that the U.S. immigrant-trade link is driven by 
immigration from relatively low-income countries. Following this method, we stratify the 
home countries by income in the present study to find out if the link in Germany is driven 
by the same way. 
The sample used for this analysis totals 71 countries as Germany’s trading partners 
with a sample period from 2002 – 2017. Table 3.1 lists the countries estimated with 
average refugee stocks. Therefore, there are 1136 (71×16) observations. The World Bank’s 
definition of income levels for countries is used to classify countries as low- or high-
income6. Of the 1136 observations, 352 are from low-income countries and 784 are from 
high-income countries. Bilateral trade flow (i.e., total trade flow, trade flow in 
manufacturing, trade flow in agriculture, forestry and fishing) data come from OECD 
STAN Bilateral Trade Database. Data on refugee stocks come from UNHCR Population 
Statistics. Data on gross domestic product (GDP), population and exchange rate (local 
currency units (LCU) per US$) come from World Bank Open Data. U.S./Euro Exchange 
Rate obtained from FRED Economic Database is used for calculating exchange rate (LCU 
per Euro). Data on border adjacency, common official language(s), colonial ties, and 
geodesic distance come from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales. The WTO Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) database is the main 
source for RTAs. Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
Estimation results for low-income countries are presented in Table 3.4. For low-
income home countries, we observe that higher GDP values of Germany correlate with 
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increased trade flows in a statistically significant manner only when manufacturing 
imports are employed as the dependent variable while higher GDP values of home 
countries are found to statistically correlate with increased trade flows when aggregate and 
manufacturing exports are employed as dependent variables. The coefficients on geodesic 
distance are negative and statistically significant at the 1% significance level only when 
three types of exports are employed as dependent variables. They are not strong enough to 
yield a statistically significant effect when three types of imports are employed as 
dependent variables. Surprisingly, the coefficients on stocks of refugee immigrants from 
low-income countries are found not to significantly facilitate Germany’s trade. Their 
magnitudes are small compared to that of coefficients on GDP and geodesic distance, and 
the only significant effect is the one when agricultural exports are employed as the 
dependent variable, but the coefficient is negative, which is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that we made. 
Turning to the estimated coefficients that are statistically significant on the 
remaining independent variables in Table 3.4, we find that the coefficient on Germany’s 
population is negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level when 
agricultural imports are employed as the dependent variable, which means that Germany 
with less domestic population imports more agricultural goods from low-income home 
countries holding other factors constant. We also find that the coefficient on the population 
of home countries is positive and statistically significant at the 10% significance level 
when manufacturing imports are employed as the dependent variable, which means that 
Germany imports more manufacturing goods from low-income home countries with 
relatively larger population holding other factors constant. The coefficient on exchange 
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rate between Euro and local currency of a home country is found to be positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% significance level when agricultural imports are 
employed as the dependent variable, suggesting that depreciation of a home country’s 
currency relative to Euro may significantly increase Germany’s agricultural imports from 
that home country despite the fact that most goods exported and imported by Germany can 
be invoiced by either U.S. dollar or Euro. Lastly, significant trade creation is found to exist 
for Germany’s agricultural imports. Being as members of a common RTA increases 
Germany’s agricultural imports from low-income home countries by 221.56% 
([(𝑒1.168 − 1) × 100]%). 
Estimation results for high-income countries are presented in Table 3.57. For high-
income home countries, the GDP coefficients are all positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level except for the coefficient on the GDP of a home country when 
agricultural imports are employed as the dependent variable, indicating that Germany with 
bigger value of GDP trades more with larger rich economies. The values of the GDP 
coefficients are below or close to unity, which is accord with the result from Sun and 
Reed’s (2010) free trade agreement study. The coefficients on geodesic distance are in 
general negative and statistically significant, suggesting that distance does have an 
inhibiting effect on trade flows. Like the results for low-income home countries in Table 
3.4, refugee coefficients in Table 3.5 are found not to be positive and statistically 
significant. Their small magnitudes suggest an inconsequential impact on Germany’s trade 
flows. The hypothesis again is not supported by the empirical results. 
Remaining coefficients that are statistically significant in Table 3.5 show: 1) 
Germany with less domestic population exports and imports more agricultural goods 
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to/from high-income home countries; 2) Germany’s aggregate and manufacturing imports 
from high-income home countries with bigger number of population is larger; 3) Having 
a common border significantly facilitates Germany’s aggregate and manufacturing exports 
to as well as its agricultural imports from high-income home countries; 4) Having common 
official language(s) has a positive effect on Germany’s aggregate and manufacturing 
exports to high-income home countries, but it has a negative effect on Germany’s 
agricultural imports from high-income home countries. 
3.5 Conclusions and Discussions    
The basic purpose of this study is to quantify impacts of Germany’s refugee 
immigrants on its trade flows. Given that prior studies show that immigrants generally 
facilitate host countries’ trade, and that Germany carries out lenient policies of integrating 
its refugee immigrants, we hypothesize that Germany’s refugee-trade correlation is 
statistically positive. We also assume that Germany’s refugee immigrants from low-
income home countries play a more important role in determining the volume of its trade 
flows than those from high-income home countries do. Empirical results of this study, 
nevertheless, are not consistent with both hypotheses – positive and significant relationship 
between Germany’s refugee stocks and its exports to and imports from those home 
countries is not found either for low-income home countries or for high-income home 
countries. 
This surprising result makes us to reconsider the impact that Germany’s refugee 
immigrants have on its trade. White and Tadesse (2010) attribute the weak impact that 
U.S. refugee immigrants on U.S. trade to their tenuous ties to home countries and the 
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constraints on refugees’ ability to maintain/foster connections to home countries’ business 
and/or social networks. Similarly, it is likely that the economic and institutional status of 
Germany’s refugee immigrants as well as their access to Germany’s human and/or 
resource networks is not capable of exerting significant pro-trade effects, despite 
Germany’s friendly immigration policies. If further studies could research on reasons to 
which the weak link is attributable, they would provide a better and more comprehensive 































   
3.6 Tables for Chapter 3 














Country Avg. Refugee stock Country Avg. Refugee stock 
Albania 1469 Mexico 41 
Angola 2340 Morocco 1434 
Argentina 34 Mozambique 80 
Australia 22 Netherlands 26 
Bangladesh 592 New Zealand 8 
Belgium 11 Nigeria 2018 
Brazil 190 Pakistan 6410 
Bulgaria 516 Peru 218 
Burkina Faso 233 Philippines 190 
Canada 73 Poland 4851 
Cabo Verde 5 Portugal 15 
Chile 422 Romania 1813 
China 3560 Russia 28191 
Colombia 207 Saudi Arabia 208 
Croatia 4236 Senegal 117 
Czech Republic 1545 Serbia 85989 
Dominican Republic 50 Singapore 15 
Egypt 892 Slovakia 167 
El Salvador 18 Slovenia 147 
Estonia 182 South Africa 80 
France 35 South Korea 279 
Ghana 2137 Spain 170 
Hungary 945 Sri Lanka 9183 
India 2093 Sweden 10 
Indonesia 125 Syria 73534 
Iran 25400 Tanzania 29 
Iraq 57795 Thailand 518 
Israel 260 Turkey 96128 
Italy 65 Ukraine 22663 
Japan 116 United Kingdom 21 
Jordan 532 United States 262 
Latvia 753 Uruguay 10 
Lebanon 9467 Venezuela 39 
Libya 649 Vietnam 15504 
Lithuania 415 Zambia 12 
Malaysia 44   
Source: The author’s calculation based on UNHCR Population Statistics. 
Note: The numbers have been rounded up to the nearest digits. 
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Bangladesh Angola Albania Australia 
Burkina Faso Cabo Verde Argentina Belgium 
Mozambique Egypt Brazil Canada 
Tanzania El Salvador Bulgaria Croatia 
 Ghana Chile Czech Republic 
 India China Estonia 
 Indonesia Colombia France 
 Iraq Dominican Republic Hungary 
 Morocco Iran Israel 
 Nigeria Jordan Italy 
 Pakistan Latvia Japan 
 Philippines Lebanon Netherlands 
 Senegal Libya New Zealand 
 Sri Lanka Lithuania Poland 
 Syria Malaysia Portugal 
 Ukraine Mexico Saudi Arabia 
 Vietnam Peru Singapore 
 Zambia Romania Slovakia 
  Russia Slovenia 
  Serbia South Korea 
  South Africa Spain 
  Thailand Sweden 
  Turkey United Kingdom 
  Uruguay United States 
  Venezuela  
Source: 2010 World Bank per capita GNI-based classification. 
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 Description Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable 
EXPij Germany’s total exports to 
country j (million dollars) 
13906.47 25675.85 6.29 141249.70 
IMPij Germany’s total imports from 
country j (million dollars) 
11287.34 20882.46 0.08 117764.30 
MaEXPij Germany’s exports to country j in 
manufacturing (million dollars) 
13135.20 24175.95 5.56 133968.60 
MaIMPij Germany’s imports from country 
j in manufacturing (million 
dollars) 
9617.36 18518.20 0.01 115207.60 
AgEXPij Germany’s exports to country j in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(million dollars) 
123.09 326.82 0 3123.81 
AgIMPij Germany’s imports from country 
j in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing (million dollars) 
344.71 897.54 0 8224.14 
Independent variable 
Yi GDP of Germany (million 
dollars) 
3301129.00 494991.20 2079136.00 3898727.00 
Yj GDP of country j (million 
dollars) 
757150.30 2088755.00 620.97 19500000.00 
GDij Geodesic distance between 
Germany and country j 
(kilometers) 
5304.69 4168.28 279.86 18386.66 
REij Refugee stock with origin country 
j (thousand) 
6.59 27.30 0.001 496.67 
POPi Population of Germany 
(thousand) 
81841.36 785.64 80274.98 82657.00 
POPj Population of country j 
(thousand) 
81228.09 212664.50 442.95 1386395.00 
USDXRATEj Exchange rate between U.S. 
dollar and local currency of 
country j 
773.89 3221.00 0.48 33226.30 
EuroXRATEj Exchange rate between Euro and 
local currency of country j 
962.52 3974.45 0.58 37549.04 
Contigij 1 if Germany and country j share 
a border; 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.26 0 1 
Comlangij 1 if Germany and country j have 
a common official language; 0 
otherwise 
0.01 0.12 0 1 
Colonyij 1 if Germany and country j have 
colonial ties; 0 otherwise 
0.01 0.12 0 1 
RTAij 1 if Germany belongs to the same 
Regional Trade Agreement with 
country j; 0 otherwise 
0.44 0.50 0 1 
 




Table 3.4 Estimation results for low-income countries 
 Dependent variable 
 EXPij IMPij MaEXPij MaIMPij AgEXPij AgIMPij 













































































































𝑅2 0.882 0.727 0.876 0.694 0.540 0.673 
Number of observations 352 352 352 352 352 352 
Note: Each parameter is from a separate regression, and the standard errors are clustered on country. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
LnUSDXRATEjt, Contigij, Comlangij, Colonyij are excluded to ensure that the estimates exist. 














Table 3.5 Estimation results for high-income countries 
 Dependent variable 
 EXPij IMPij MaEXPij MaIMPij AgEXPij AgIMPij 

















































































































































𝑅2 0.960 0.849 0.963 0.816 0.679 0.433 
Number of observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 
Note: Each parameter is from a separate regression, and the standard errors are clustered on country. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
LnUSDXRATEjt is excluded to ensure that the estimates exist. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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CHAPTER 4.  ADAPTATION MEANS AS PROMOTERS FOR CLIMATE-
INDUCED MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
Abstract 
Climate-induced migration refers to population mobility of the international community 
where people are forced to leave their traditional habitats for improving the quality of life 
in host countries due to climatic factors that jeopardize their existence in their home 
countries. This type of migration occurs mostly in least developed countries (LDCs), 
because these countries have comparatively high rural population shares and agricultural 
earnings represent the major income source for their citizens. These migrants are among 
the poorest, and consequently they are more vulnerable to adverse climatic factors that 
have negative impacts on agricultural yields. The main adverse climatic factor for 
agriculture is higher temperature. Higher temperature reduces agricultural yields and in 
turn reduces agricultural earnings, making costs of long-distance migration to 
comparatively rich countries unaffordable to those climatic migrants. This is known as the 
climate-migration poverty trap. Much has been written about the means that can modulate 
the trap. In this study, we quantify impacts of three adaptation means (more access to 
irrigation, less CO2 emission and larger amount of foreign direct investment (FDI)) on the 
migration rate for 23 LDCs of origin with respect to 129 countries of destination. Empirical 
results show that all the three means are promotors that significantly facilitate the climate-
induced migration and that access to irrigation has a much bigger influence. 
KEYWORDS: Climate-induced Migration, Least Developed Countries, Irrigation, CO2 




   
4.1 Introduction 
According to 2020 Global Report on Internal Displacement, issued by Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), a part of Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 
some 5.1 million people in 95 countries and territories have relocated within their home 
countries because of natural disasters that happened in 2019 or prior years. The exact 
number of people relocating abroad due to adverse climatic factors remains controversial, 
but there is no doubt that the total number of climatic migrants is soaring and is predicted 
to reach tens and hundreds of millions within the next 20 and 50 years, respectively (Park 
2011). The consequential number of climatic migrants has made topics in climate-induced 
migration a vanguard of research on international development. 
Climate-induced migration occurs more often in least developed countries (LDCs) 
than in their more developed counterparts. For one thing, LDCs have a larger share of rural 
population whose income level depends heavily upon weather conditions, and those 
countries have limited capacity for applying mitigation measures (e.g., planting drought-
resistant crops and investing in irrigation) that can offset, at least in part, the negative 
impacts caused by adverse climate. They also lack necessary preparations through 
adaptation means, such as well-established systems for agricultural insurance and 
improvements for water storage, use and flood defense. Countries fall within the sphere 
mentioned above thus are more vulnerable and are affected more significantly when 
environmental changes or natural disasters take place. The United Nations (UN) defines 
LDCs as countries highly vulnerable to environmental shocks. The Least Developed 
Counties Report 2015 issued by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) finds that more than two thirds of total population of LDCs live in rural areas. 
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The report points out that climate change is one of the main factors that affect yield growth 
in agriculture in LDCs and that it is likely to have a negative effect on agricultural 
productivity in most LDCs.  
For another, people from LDCs commonly migrate abroad in search of more 
affluent lives. This is understandable given that wages abroad usually are far higher than 
those at home. Tangible evidence is that the amount of their remittances, the income that 
they send home, has been increasing (Taylor 2006; De Haas 2007; Maimbo and Ratha 
2005). The remittances increase household income directly, encouraging consumption and 
investment in LDCs. They also become an important source of foreign-exchange reserves 
for those migrants’ countries of origin. All this helps reduce poverty, improve people’s 
welfare, and increase LDCs’ resilience to climatic shocks, so migrating abroad cannot only 
benefit LDCs’ people individually, but a country as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the fact is that not all can afford migration costs, and those who are 
unable to migrate due to financial constraints are thus trapped in poverty. Researchers use 
the term “climate-migration poverty trap” to describe this pernicious circle (Jacobson et 
al. 2019; Benonnier, Millock, and Taraz 2019). The “climate-migration poverty trap” starts 
with negative outcomes for agricultural yields, like low levels of rainfall, scarcity of 
underground water, or locust plagues. All these abnormalities result from one adverse 
climatic factor – high temperature. Then the “climate-migration poverty trap” begins – 
high temperature reduces agricultural yields, and in turn reduces the income of people 
from LDCs, making migration costs unaffordable for them. The impossibility of moving 




   
The “climate-migration poverty trap” is found in existing literature. On the one 
hand, previous studies show direct impacts of high temperatures that reduce agriculture 
yield and in turn reduce farm net revenues (Mendelsohn & Massetti 2017; Jones and Olken 
2010; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2009; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012; Kurukulasuriya and 
Mendelsohn 2007). On the other hand, the relationship between high temperatures and 
human migration for LDCs has also been quantified by existing literature. Benonnier, 
Millock, and Taraz (2019) find that higher temperatures correlate with decreased migration 
rates from the poorest countries (measured by GDP per capita) while no such effect is 
found for countries with GDP per capita in the upper quartiles of the distribution. Cattaneo 
and Peri (2016) analyze the impact of warming trends on internal and external migration 
by applying data from 115 countries between 1960 and 2000 and conclude that higher 
temperatures reduce the probability of both domestic and international migration in poor 
countries. Cattaneo and Massetti (2015) investigate migration as a response to climate 
change in Ghana and Nigeria and find that households located in districts with high 
temperature are less likely to become migrant families than their counterparts located in 
districts with mild temperatures.  
The “climate-migration poverty trap” causes humanitarian emergencies, presenting 
the question, “How to overcome the mobility constraint and get “trapped” population out 
of persistent poverty?” This is one of the most challenging policy issues nowadays. 
Investment in irrigation expansion could be an adaptation strategy that helps weaken the 
poverty trap. Researchers find that irrigation expansion reduces vulnerability to water 
stress in warmer climate for target regions, increasing crop productivity to provide food 
for many people applying irrigation as an effective adaptation against higher temperature 
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to agriculture (Rosa et al. 2020; Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2007; Ashofteh, Bozorg-
Haddad, and Loáiciga 2017). This offsetting effect of irrigation on the poverty trap can 
make agriculture in LDCs less sensitive to unfavorable climate caused by higher 
temperature and those climate migrants more likely to be able to afford the migration cost. 
Two other adaptions that this study considers feasible involve less CO2 emission 
and larger amount of foreign direct investment (FDI). For the former, reducing the amount 
of CO2 emission is found to decelerate the global warming trend (Radhi 2009; Matthews 
and Caldeira 2008). In 2015, top emitters of CO2 signed the Paris Agreement, committed 
to reduce the emission for fighting the climate crisis. CO2, known as a major greenhouse 
gas, is found to be responsible for global and regional increase in temperature (Hansen and 
Sato 2016). Although the amount of CO2 emission from LDCs is very small compared to 
that from industrialized nations, low-carbon growth paths, instead of high-carbon growth 
paths, is suggested for LDCs’ development (Bowen, Fankhauser, and Best 2011). 
Therefore, reducing the amount of CO2 emission may not be a means to moderate LDCs’ 
temperature directly, but it is a suggested way of enhancing LDCs’ productivity and well-
being, making LDCs’ people more likely to be able to afford the migration cost. 
For the latter, UNCTAD reports that FDI contributes to promoting sustainable 
development and reducing social and income disparities in most LDCs. The benefits of 
FDI for LDCs are including but not limited to: 1) employment generation and growth; 2) 
integration into the global economy; 3) raising skills of local manpower; 4) transfer of 
modern technologies (Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006). The prominent benefits of FDI 
means that FDI has been of great help for LDCs in their efforts to reduce poverty and 
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overcome income inequality. FDI, therefore, also plays as a role for improving the 
affordability of people in LDCs as irrigation expansion does.  
In this paper, we quantify impacts of the three adaptation means (more access to 
irrigation, less CO2 emission and larger amount of FDI) on migration rate for 23 LDCs of 
origin with respect to 129 countries of destination. Of the 23 LDCs, 21 are sub-Saharan 
countries. Most of sub-Saharan countries have a tropical climate and a yearly average 
temperature around 64 degrees Fahrenheit (about 18 degrees Celsius) (Pulsipher and 
Pulsipher 2008). They thus serve as good observations on how to overcome the “climate-
migration poverty trap”. We believe that adaptation means in response to adverse climate 
caused by high temperature can help people escape, at least in part, from the “climate-
migration poverty trap”. Therefore, the following hypothesis is made: 
H. More access to irrigation, less CO2 emission and larger amount of foreign direct 
investment are three adaptation strategies for LDCs in response to high temperatures that 
reduce agricultural yields. They function as promotors that facilitate climate-induced 
migration. 
4.2 Literature review 
While the viewpoint that adverse climate (e.g., high temperature, low level of 
precipitation, natural disasters, etc.) negatively correlates with international migration for 
less developed countries prevails in academia, opposite findings also exist in literature. 
Beine and Parsons (2015) consider high temperature as an environmental factor that 
influences international migration, but find little direct, temperature-induced impact across 
their entire sample consisting of both LDCs and other countries. They also find that natural 
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disasters cause increasing flows of migrants to urban environs. Bohra-Mishra et al. (2017) 
conclude that increases in temperature and typhoon activity lead to increases, rather than 
decreases, in outmigration for the Philippines and that precipitation does not have the 
same, significant effect. Cai et al. (2016) show that a rise in temperature positively, instead 
of negatively, correlates with outmigration only for agriculture-dependent countries (1℃ 
increase in temperature leads to 5% increase in outmigration). Other studies with opposite 
findings (Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer, and Hsiang 2014; Gray and Wise 2016; Mueller, 
Gray, and Hopping 2020; Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2012) make the 
viewpoint towards the impact of temperature on migration more mixed. However, those 
who find that climate change has little impact do not deny that environmental factors 
influence international migration but argue that they might influence migration through 
indirect channels (e.g., temperature-related natural disasters). Studies which find a positive 
relationship between temperature and human mobility see such an effect usually in internal 
migration in which the cost of relocation is comparatively low and more affordable for 
those climatic migrants.  
When it comes to the methods that can absorb the income shock caused by adverse 
climate in agriculture-based economies, other than irrigation expansion, researchers have 
also offered suggestions pertaining on how to weaken the climate-migration poverty trap 
to planners and policy makers through social or institutional perspectives (Black et al. 
2008; Luetz 2018). Nawrotzki and DeWaard (2018) find that access to migrant networks 
enables climate related mobility in the poorest district. Barrett et al. (2007) highlight the 
importance of micro-finance innovation in climate-induced migration. To date, few studies 
have quantified the effect of applying a wide range of adaptation strategies on climate-
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induced migration. The present paper tries to fill this void by accounting for three means 
(i.e., more access to irrigation, less CO2 emissions and larger amounts of FDI) that are 
assumed to attenuate the link between adverse climate and migration flows, providing 
empirical evidence for future research. 
4.3 Econometric Model 
Since the assumption that the relationship between climate-related stresses and 
migration is linear is not supported by existing literature (Black et al. 2008; Feng, Krueger, 
and Oppenheimer 2010; Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer, and Hsiang 2014; Beine and 
Parsons 2015; Cai et al. 2016), we follow Benonnier, Millock, and Taraz’s (2019) climate-
migration-irrigation study by using a log-linear model and estimate: 
ln(𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑗) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗    (4.1) 
where i is a country of origin, and j is a country of destination. ln (𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑗) is the log of 
migration rate (
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖−𝑗 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
) in 2017. 𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖  is the 
share of 2017’s land area equipped for irrigation for country i. 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖 is 2017’s total CO2 
emission in agriculture for country i. 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 is 2017’s total foreign direct investment for 
country i. 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖  and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖  are 2017’s temperature change
8 and long-term average of 
annual precipitation, respectively, for country i. 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 is 2017’s rural population share 
for country i. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  are per capita GDP for country i and j in 2017, 
respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗  and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗  are three dummies. They are equal to 
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one if country i and j have a common border, common official language(s) and colonial 
ties, respectively. 𝐺𝐷𝑖𝑗 is the geodesic distance between country i and j. 𝑖𝑗 is the error 
term. For comparison, we conduct two separate regressions based on the model by using 
the methods of ordinary least squares (OLS) and then generalized method of moments 
(GMM).  
Two reasons account for the use of GMM. To begin with, our use of cross-sectional 
data raises the issue of heteroscedasticity (the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is found 
to be rejected at the 1% significance level by a White test). What is more, we consider an 
endogeneity issue that 2017’s temperature change is potentially correlated with the error 
term 𝑖𝑗, which includes unobserved, temperature-related factors in 2017. To address the 
issue of endogeneity, we choose 2016’s temperature change for a country of origin as the 
sole instrument for this model. We suppose: 1) 2016’s temperature change does not have 
a direct effect on 2017’s migration rate; 2) 2016’s temperature change is not correlated 
with the error term 𝑖𝑗; 3) 2016’s temperature change is strongly correlated with 2017’s 
temperature change. Hausman test shows that 2017’s temperature change is correlated 
with the error term 𝑖𝑗  at the 1% significance level, which verifies our concern of 
endogeneity. We also verify that 2016’s temperature change is a strong instrument by 
conducting the Software Stata’s first stage check.  
4.4 Data 
The website of UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs provides data on 
2017 estimates of international migrant stock at mid-year by origin. The dataset also 
presents classification of countries by development level or income. FAOSTAT, a UN 
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Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database, provides data on total population, 
land area equipped for irrigation, total land area, total CO2 emission in agriculture, and 
total FDI inflows in the year of 2017. FAOSTAT also provides data on 2016’s and 2017’s 
temperature change. Another database of FAO, AQUASTAT, provides data on long-term 
average (over space and time) of annual precipitation and 2017 rural population by 
country. Data on per capita GDP by country are obtained from The World Bank database. 
Data on border adjacency, common official language(s), colonial ties and geodesic 
distance come from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. 
The final sample consists of 23 countries of origin and 129 counties of destination. After 
excluding missing data, we have 1007 observations left for analysis. Table 4.1 presents 
summary statistics for the variables used in this study. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
Table 4.2 shows the results of estimating equation 4.1. OLS and GMM regressions 
explain 49.2% and 48.2% of the variation in the observed migration flows, respectively. 
Given that the migration rates are quite heterogenous and that we use cross-sectional data, 
the values of R2 are reasonable. Overall, all estimates in both estimations have expected 
signs, which are consistent with the hypothesis. 
We first find a significant and positive effect of irrigation on emigration at the 1% 
significance level and the magnitude is the largest in both the OLS and GMM columns: a 
one-percent increase in proportion of land area equipped for irrigation for a country of 
origin leads to a 1620.4% increase (OLS) and a 1938.1% increase (GMM) in migration 
rate for that country. The mean value of the migration rate across the sample in this study 
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is around 0.11%, so we use the Burkina Faso-Niger corridor, whose migration rate is 
0.118%, as an example to put the estimate into perspectives: when the GMM method is 
applied, in 2017, if Burkina Faso’s share of irrigated land could increase by 1%, its 
migration rate to Niger would increase by nearly twentyfold, from 0.118% to 2.287%, 
holding other factors constant. Given that Burkina Faso’s population in 2017 is 
19,193,234, this result means that about 416,301 more people in Burkina Faso would be 
able to migrate to Niger because of the improvement of irrigation.  
As to the other two adaption means, a one-thousand-gigagram increase in CO2 
emission in agriculture significantly reduces the migration rate at the 1% significance 
level, leading to a 2.5% decrease in the OLS estimation and a 3.2% decrease in the GMM 
estimation. In other words, less CO2 emission is correlated with increased migration rate. 
Bowen, Fankhauser, and Best (2011) discuss the reasons why LDCs should adopt low-
carbon growth paths in details. They point out that reductions in CO2 emission allow LDCs 
to well integrate themselves to the increasingly “green” world in terms of trade, 
technological progress and environmental protection and that individuals and a country as 
a whole eventually benefit from this trending and promising ways of development. A one-
billion-dollar increase in FDI significantly increases migration rate at the 5% (OLS) and 
the 1% (GMM) significance levels, leading to a 27.9% increase and a 37.2% increase, 
respectively. This positive relationship between FDI and migration rate tacitly 
demonstrates that FDI helps improve the affordability of LDCs’ people. Using the Burkina 
Faso-Niger corridor as an example again, we can conclude that when the GMM method is 
applied, in 2017, if Burkina Faso’s FDI amount could increase by one billion dollars, its 
migration rate to Niger would increase from 0.118% to 0.162%. This result means that 
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about 8445 more people in Burkina Faso would be able to migrate to Niger because of the 
increased amount of FDI. 
The coefficients on the remaining variables in the OLS and GMM columns are as 
expected. Temperature change positively affects the migration rate at the 5% (OLS) and 
the 1% (GMM) significance levels. This result remarkably shows that temperature 
anomalies are a vital factor linking to the climate-induced migration. The coefficient on 
precipitation is significant only in the OLS estimation. It is positive and significant at the 
5% level of significance, but the magnitude is small, only 0.03%. 
A one-percent increase in the rural population share for a country of origin 
significantly reduces that country’s migration rate by 123.7% when the OLS method is 
applied. This coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level. 
In other words, people in rural areas of LDCs are found to be less likely to afford the 
migration cost. No such significant effect is found when the GMM method is applied. The 
coefficients on per capita GDP for the country of origin and that for the country of 
destination are positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level in both 
estimations. A one-thousand-dollar increase in the per capita GDP for a country of origin 
leads to a 75.1% increase (OLS) and a 78.7% increase (GMM) in the migration rate, 
indicating the important role that affordability plays when people in LDCs decide whether 
to move to a foreign country. A one-thousand-dollar increase in the per capita GDP for a 
country of destination leads to a 2.7% increase in the migration rate in both estimations, 
suggesting that richer countries are more attracted to those climate-induced migrants. 
The coefficients on the three dummies are all statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. Having a common border, common official language(s) and colonial 
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ties for a country of destination appeal to climate-induced migrants more by 340.6%, 
229.4% and 321.8%, respectively, in the OLS estimation, and 348.7%, 230.9% and 
321.1%, respectively, in the GMM estimation. Lastly, a one-thousand-kilometer increase 
in the geodesic distance between home and host countries causes a decrease in the 
migration rate by 31.4% and 29.9%, in the OLS and GMM estimations, respectively, both 
at the 1% significance level.  
4.6 Conclusions and Discussions 
The basic purpose of this study is to quantify the impacts of three adaptation means 
in response to adverse climate, higher temperature mainly, on external migration for 
LDCs. We assume that expansion of irrigated cropland, reductions of CO2 emission and 
attracting more FDI can help increase agricultural income for rural people living in LDCs, 
making long-distance migration to a foreign country more affordable for them. The three 
adaptation means therefore function as promotors that facilitate climate-induced 
migration. The results are generally consistent with the hypothesis. While demonstrating 
that more access to irrigation is an agricultural channel that drives climate-induced 
migration as some studies have confirmed, we also find that less CO2 emission and larger 
amount of FDI have the same, although smaller, effect. 
Our results shed light on ways of helping the rural population in LDCs to get rid of 
poverty. The 2019 report issued by the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
states that international migration contributes to LDCs’ economic and social development 
if managed well, because the remittances, the transfer of skills, the access to possible 
education abroad make the diaspora population active agents for developing their home 
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countries. For that matter, we should take actions aiming at supporting LDCs’ people to 
access safe and regular migration channels. The positive relationship between the 
expansion of irrigated cropland and migration rate in this study suggests that enhancing a 
wide range of infrastructure that can positively affect LDCs’ agriculture yield may greatly 
increase the rural people’s affordability for migratory movement to a foreign country. 
Investing in this area should be a promising way for developed countries that want to help. 
Limiting LDCs’ emission of greenhouse gases to the criteria of low-carbon development 
is another way. Adopting low-carbon growth paths allow LDCs to well integrate 
themselves to the increasingly “green” world in terms of trade, technological progress, and 
environmental protection, and LDCs eventually benefit from this trending ways of 
development. As to FDI in LDCs, the influence of FDI on the migration rate in this study 
seems much smaller than that of irrigation, probably because FDI in most LDCs has been 
disproportionately inflowing into urban centers, leaving large rural areas suffering from 
the lack of FDI (UNCTAD Report 2011). The limited amount of FDI in poorer regions 
causes that the effect of FDI on well-being improvement for LDCs’ people is not as 
prominent as expected. If policy makers could find a way of attracting more FDI while 
letting FDI favor the rural areas, the large number of the rural population would benefit 














4.7 Tables for Chapter 4 










Variable Units Mean S.D. Min. Max 
Migration rate estimated at mid-year for country of origin with respect to country of destination % 0.11 0.51 0.00000094 6.81 
Proportion of land area equipped for irrigation for country of origin % 1.07 2.22 0.002 9.55 
Total CO2 emission in agriculture for country of origin Thousand gigagrams 23.46 25.90 0.26 102.93 
Total foreign direct investment for country of origin Billion dollars 0.64 0.98 0.003 4.02 
Temperature change for country of origin Celsius 1.38 0.40 0.27 2.12 
Long-term average of annual endogenous precipitation in depth for country of origin mm/year 1109.33 574.59 151.00 2526.00 
Rural population share for country of origin % 66.58 14.03 37.31 88.14 
Per capita GDP for country of origin Thousand dollars 0.81 0.30 0.36 1.55 
Per capita GDP for country of destination Thousand dollars 25.84 24.08 0.29 107.63 
Contiguity between country of origin and country of destination 1 = common border 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Common official language between country of origin and country of destination 1 = common language 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Colonial ties between country of origin and country of destination 1 = colonial ties 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Geodesic distance between country of origin and country of destination Thousand kilometers 5.26 3.32 0.16 17.65 
 
59 
   
Table 4.2 Estimation results 
Dependent variable: log of Migration rate  OLS GMM 




















































Number of observations 1007 1007 
R2 0.492 0.482 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 






















   
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation provides some important findings. Firstly, as an anti-immigrant 
law, the U.S. Real ID Act does have a negative impact on the U.S. agricultural sectors that 
are labor-intensive. Although empirical results in essay one (Chapter 2) suggest that U.S. 
farmers may alleviate the negative impact through adaptation means, finding a way of 
legalizing those illegal immigrant farmworkers is still much needed to stabilize the 
agricultural labor market and enhance U.S. food security. Secondly, although positive and 
significant relationship between Germany’s refugee stocks and its exports to and imports 
from the home countries where the refugees originate is not found, empirical results in 
essay two (Chapter 3) do not show that refugees are a burden of Germany’s economy in 
terms of the trade flows. Germany’s refugee immigrants may be not yet capable of exerting 
remarkable pro-trade effects, but Germany’s efforts to well integrate refugee immigrants 
into its society should be acknowledged and appreciated.  
Lastly, essay three (Chapter 4) sheds light on ways of helping the rural population 
in LDCs to access migration channels. Expanding irrigated cropland, reducing emission 
of greenhouse gases, and attracting more FDI are three suggested measures of increasing 
the well-being of people in LDCs. They eventually make people in LDCs more likely to 
be able to afford the migration cost. To sum up, this dissertation suggests lenient laws and 
policies towards immigrants and provides feasible methods and strategies for the 






   
APPENDIX 1 
Notes 
1. Illegal, unauthorized and undocumented will be used interchangeably. These terms are 
used to mean a person who resides in the United States, but who is not a U.S. citizen, has 
not been admitted for permanent residence, and is not in an authorized temporary status 
permitting longer-term residence and work (Passel, Van Hook, and Bean 2004).   
2. 
Population of unauthorized immigrant farmworkers
=
Estimated total authorized farmworkers 
(1 − shares of unauthorized immigrant farmworkers)
× shares of unauthorized immigrant farmworkers 
3. 287(g) agreement aims to expand the federal government’s enforcement capacities while 
enabling state, county, and local law enforcement agencies to respond directly to popular 
concerns regarding illegal immigration (Rodriguez et al. 2010). 
4. Form I-9 is used for verifying the identity and employment authorization of individuals 
hired for employment in the United States. Acceptable documents that accompany form I-
9 include a state driver’s license and a state identification card (U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS)). 
5. In general, migrant farmworkers are individuals who travel a greater distance to farm 
sites and cannot return daily to their permanent residences. Seasonal farmworkers, on the 
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other hand, temporarily work in agriculture without having to leave their residence (Lewis, 
Martinez, and Coronado 2017). 
6. In the calendar year 2010, the World Bank classified nations as low-income if 2010 gross 
national income (GNI) per capita was ≤ $1005; lower middle-income if GNI per capita was 
between $1006 and $3975; upper middle-income if GNI per capita was between $3976 and 
$12275; high-income if GNI per capita > $12275. We merge the low-income and lower 
middle-income home countries into one group: low-income countries; the upper middle-
income and high-income ones into another group: high-income countries. Table 3.2 lists 
the countries in the data set by income class. 
7. The number of remaining independent variables in Table 3.5 is different from that in 
Table 3.4 due to Poisson regression creating “perfect predictors”. Stata automatically drops 
“perfect predictors”, and the number of the “perfect predictors” varies based on data used 
(Silva and Tenreyro 2010; Silva and Tenreyro 2011). 
wis, Martinez, and Coronado 2017). 
8. The FAOSTAT Temperature Change domain disseminates statistics of mean surface 
temperature change by country, with annual updates. The dissemination covers the period 
1961 – 2019. Statistics are available for annual mean temperature anomalies, i.e., 
temperature change with respect to a baseline climatology, corresponding to the period 





   
APPENDIX 2 
List of Countries for essay three (Chapter 4) 
Origins (23): Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe 
Destinations (129): Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo 
Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic 
of the Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Curaçao, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Puerto Rico, Republic of Korea, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, 
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United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Viet Nam, 
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